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RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of N'ew Hampshire.
BASSETT VS. SALISBURY MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
If the owners of a dam on a watercourse, by means of their dam, obstruct I be
natural drainage from the land of another, to his actual injury, they are liable
to him therefor, although his land is not situated upon the watercourse, unlessuch obstruction was caused by them in the reasonable use of their own land o,
privilege.
What, in any particular case, is a reasonable use or management, is ordinarily a
mixed question of law and fact, to be submitted to the jury under the instruction
of the courL

Case. The declaration is set forth at length in 28 N. H. 438.
The writ was dated August" 17th 1849.
At the trial, the plaintiff limited his claim, for the purposes of
that trial only; to the damage caused by the defendants' dam to
the lot of thirty-three acres, described in the declaration.
The plans used on the trial were to be referred to in the argument. Said lot is situated in Kingston, about half a mile from
Powow river. The natural drainage of the lot, and of other adjacent swampy lands, is into the river above the defendants' dam.
The surface of the lot is higher than the ordinary level of the
water in the river. The levels are shown by the plans. 'It was
made a question whether there was any watercourse on the lot.
In July 1837, one Shilling, who then owned the lot, dug a
ditch on it, about ten rods long, beginning at the line on the side
nearest the river. -All that part of the lot drained by this ditch
was called Miry Ditch. Shilling, who was called as a witness by
the plaintiff, testified concerning Miry Ditch as follows:"There was no 'sign of a ditch before I dug one. The water
was within a foot of the top of the ground when I dug, and after
that the ditch got nearly dry that season; dug it in July 1837.
and by the 1st -of August it was nearly dry. I dug the ditch
about ten rods up from Eaton's land; no ditch there before. I
dug through blue-joint grass. The soil that I dug up was covered
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with grass. In a dry time I could not tell but where I dug was
on a level with the land on both sides."
There was no evidence in conflict with the testimony of Shilling
as to this artificial ditch. After the jury had been out nearly
three hours, they desired to have read to them the minute-, oi
Shilling's testimony bearing upon the question whether there was
a watercourse at Miry Ditch before he dug his ditch. The court
complied with their request, and the jury immediately returned
their verdict.
The court instructed the jury as follows:
A watercourse is something more than running water. A watercourse is a stream of water, usually flowing in a definite channel,
having a bed and sides, or banks, and usually discharging itself into
some other stream or body of water. To constitute a watercourse,
the size of the stream is not important. It may be vory small,
and the flow of the water need not be constant; but it must be
somethilg more than a mere surface drainage over the entire face
of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary causes; and underground percolation is not a watercourse.
A watercourse may be natural, as a river or brook; or artificial,
as a canal or ditch after twenty years' use. A watercourse is not
to be ascertained or determined by the condition of water in a
great and unusual freshet, or when raised temporarily by a dam,
but it must have existed in a natural state, or after twenty years'
use.
'The ditch dug by Shilling was not a watercourse. Even if it
would have been a watercourse if dug twenty years before March
10th 1847, it was not a watercourse in 1847, 1848, or 1849, because it had not then been dug twenty years; so that the question as to a watercourse at Miry Ditch, is, Was there a watercolirse
there before Shilling dug the ditch ? or, Would there have been a
watercourse there if he had not dug the ditch?
The legal rights of persons through whose lands there is a
watercourse are definite and undisputed. The lower owner has
the right that the upper adjoining owner shall not wholly stop the
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stream, and drain it off so that none of it can enter the land
below; the. upper owner has the right that the lower adjoining
owner shall not perceptibly raise the height of the stream above
the division line between them. The lower one has the right that
the stream shall come down into his land; the upper one has the
right that the stream shall go down off his land. These rights
are mutual, corresponding, and correlative. They are incident to
watercourses, and belong exclusively to riparian proprietors.
Where there is no watercourse, there are no owners of the banks
of a watercourse; no riparian proprietors. And where there are
no Tiparian proprietors, the peculiar correlative rights of riparian
proprietors do not exist.
If the defendants, by their dam, threw any water back on to or
into the plaintiff's lot, they are liable, whether there was a watercourse on it or not. But if they did not throw any water back
on to or into his lot, it is material to inquire whether there was
any watercourse on it or in it.
If A. owns a lot of land higher than the adjoining lot of B.,
and there is no watercourse on either lot, but the natural subterranean percolating drainage is from A.'s into B.'s, A., by
draining in another direction, bywells or by any barrier or obstruction on his own land below and above the surface, along the
division line between them, may prevent the water from passing
into B.'s land; and B. may dig a cellar on his lot, up to the division line, and keep the water out of it; may drain his lot, and
keep it dry; may dig out his soil, and make a pond; and if, for
any such purposes, he does not want the drainage from A.'s lot,
he may put a cemented wall on his own land, the whole length of
the division line, so deep below and so high above the surface that
no water can pass from either lot to the other. A. is not obliged
to let the water go down into B.'s land, and B. is not obliged to
let it come down. If there was a watercourse running through
their lots, neither could wholly stop it at the division line; but
there being no watercourse, and no correlative rights of riparian
proprietors, both may stop the percolation. And B. may stop the
percolation across the line by water, as well as by stone, wood, or
VOL. XII.-15
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earth. For purposes of natural, subterranean, percolating drainage, or for purposes of improvement by artificial draining, where
there is no watercourse, A. does not own the natural fall on or iD
B.'s land, but B. owns it; and if B. merely destroys that fall, by
making his land more solid, and filling it up with other soil as high
as or higher than A.'s, or by filling and covering his own land
with water, A. has no legal remedy, if no water is thrown back
upon or into his land.
If there was a watercourse on or in the plaintiff's lot, and running out of it to the river, the plaintiff could not fill it up, or stop
it, or drain off all the water from it in other directions, so as to
wholly prevent it from going into the defendants' pond; and the
defendants could not flow the water back by their dam, so as
actually and. perceptibly to raise the natural level of the water
in any part- of the watercourse on the plaintiff's lot. But if there
was no such stream on or in the plaintiff's lot as the defendants
had a right to have flow, if there was no such stream that the defendants could make the plaintiff pay them damages for wholly
stopping it, then there was no such stream as to make the defendants liable merely for stopping it.
If the plaintiff had the right to prevent all the water in his land
from going into the defendants' pond, then the defendants had
the same right to keep it back. If the defendants had the right
that the plaintiff's land should hold water for them, and that the
water should come down to them, then they had not the right to
keep it back in his land.
, If there was no watercourse on or in the thirty-three acres, it
is immaterial whether or not there was a watercourse all the way
or a part of the way between the thirty-three acres and the river.
The principal points in this case may be summed up thus :I. Was there, on or between vtarch 10th 1847 and August 17th
1849, a watercourse within the bounds of the thirty-three acre
lot, and running into or running out of it ?
If there was, and if the defendants, by their dam, at any time
during that period, raised the water in such watercourse on the
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thirty-three acres perceptibly higher than its natural level, they
are liable, extraordinary freshets being excepted.
IL If the defendants, by their dam, at any time during the
same period, threw any water back on to or into the thirty-three
acres, they are liable, extraordinary freshets being excepted. But
they are not liable for merely stopping the surface drainage, or
the underground, percolating drainage, where there was no watercourse.
The freshets, for the consequences of which the defendants are
not liable, are not the usual and-ordinary ones of spring, or such
as may generally be expected every year, but such as are unusual,
extraordinary, and not to be expected.
If the plaintiff's right was infringed, he is entitled to nominal
damages, even if his land was not injured, or even if it was actually benefited by the acts complained of; and if his right was
infringed, he is entitled to such actual damages as you believe he
has sustained, and interest thereon from the date of the writ.
The plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury
1. That the plaintiff had the right to use his land for the ordinary purposes for which such land is used, and to improve it by
the usual and proper processes of husbandry; and that any obstruction by the defendants' dam of. the waters of the Powow
river which prevented such use, within the time alleged, rendered
the defendants liable in this suit.
2: That if the defendants, by means of their dam, caused backwater upon the plaintiff's land, or caused the wa.ter falling upon
or running into the land to remain and keep the land substantially
and visibly wet longer or in a greater degree than otherwise
would have occurred (within the time alleged), the defendants are
liable.
3. That if the plaintiff's land is a part of a large tract of
swampy land which lies upon the Powow river, and is drained by
said river, the defendants are liable, if (within the time alleged)
they have by their dam held back the waters of said river, so as
to prevent the natural drainage of the plaintiff's land, and render
it substantially and visibly wetter, to his damage, although the
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plaintiff's land does not abut on said river, there being no land
between said river and the plaintiff's land higher than his land.
4 If the defendants, by means of their dam, have actually
caused back-water upon the plaintiff's land, or if they have actually and perceptibly kept water upon it, or, in other words, if his
land has been made and kept wetter (substantially and visibly so)
than it would have been but for the dam, he is entitled to at least
nominal damages, and to such actual damages as the jury may
believe he has sustained.
5. If the defendants' dam, as it was kept up, caused injury to
the plaintiff's land by keeping the water upon it, whether it was
the water of the Powow river, or the little streams flowing into it,
or that falling upon it in rains, he is entitled to at least nominal
damages, and to such actual damages as the jury may believe he
has sustained.
6. If a ditch in another place crooked, and Shilling's ditch took
the place of it, that is the same as if the ditch was dug in the
same place.
7. A freshet such as actually occurs every spring is not an
extraordinary freshet; but if the company have flowed by their
dam in such freshets, the defendants are liable.
The court declined to instruct the jury as requested.
To the instructions given, and to the refusal to give the instructions requested, the plaintiff excepted; and a verdi-,t boing returned against him, he moved to set the same azide and for a new
trial.
Hf. F. French (with whom were Marston 6 Tuu.le), for the plain.
tLif, cited and commented on Tyler vs. WTlkinson, 4 Mason 397;
Rawstrom vs. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369; Lroadbent vs. Ramsbotham;
11 Id. 602; Chasemorevs. Richards,? Hurls. & Norm. 168; Dick
inson vs. Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282; Adon vs. Blundell, 12 M. &
W. 324; Cooper vs. Barber, 3 Taurt. 99; Greenleaf vs. Francis,
18 Pick. 117 ; Ellis vs. Duncan, 21 Barb. 233 ; Smith vs. Adams,
6 Paige 435; Smith vs. Keni ck, 7 C. B. 515; Whately vs. Baugh,
1 Casey 528; Luther vs. Winnisimmet Co., 9 Cush. 171; Ang. on
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Watercourses 119; Brown vs. West, 1 Wils. 174; Arnold vs
Foot, 12 Wend. 330; Parker vs. B. d"M. Railroad,2 Cush. 107;
Monsor Co. vs. Fuller, 15 Pick. 554; Palmer vs. Terrell,17 Pick.
58; Bassett vs. Salisbury Co., 28 N. H. 438.
S. M. Wilcox (with whom were Christie and D. Clark), for the
defendants, cited and commented on Luther vs. Winnisimmet Co.,
9 Cush. 174; Greenleaf vs. Francis, 18 Pick. 121; Flagg vs.
Worcester, 13 Gray 605 (and Parks vs. Newburyport, there cited);
Acton vs. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 348; Chasemore vs. Richards, 2
Hurls. & Norm. 168 (s. c., 5 Hurls. & Norm. 92); Dickinson vs.
Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282; Rawtrom, vs. Taylor, 33 E. L. & H
428; Broadbent vs. Ramsbotham, 34 Id. 553; Runnels vs. Bullen,
2 N. H. 586; Cooper vs. Barber, 3 Taunt. 99; Dickinson vs.
Canal Uo., 9 E. L. & E. 520; Parker vs. B. & M. Railroad,2
Cush. 107; Monson Co. vs. Fuller, 15 Pick. 554; Palmer Co. vs.
MAferrill, 17 Pick. 558; Balston vs. Benstead, 1 Camp. 463; Tyler
vs. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397; Dextervs. Providence Co., 1 Story
387;. llis vs. Duncan, 21 Barb. 236; Whately vs. Baugh, 25
Penn. 528; 'hatfield vs. Wilson, 28 Vt. 459; Smith vs. Herrick,
62 E. C. L. 514;-Roath vs. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533; Thurston vs.
Hancock, 12 Mass. 220; Panton vs. Holland, 17 Johns. 92; Ba8sett vs. Salisbury Co., 28 N. H. 438.
BARTLETT, J.-No landowner has an absolute and unqualified
right to the unaltered natural drainage or percolation to or from
his neighbor's land. In general, it would be impossible for a
landowner to avoid disturbing the natural percolation or drainage,
without a practicdl abandonment of all improvement or beneficial
enjoyment of his land. Any doctrine that would forbid all action
of a landowner affecting the relations as to percolation or drainage between his own and his neighbors' lands, would in effect deprive him of his property; and so far from being an application
of the maxim, "Cuius est solum," &c., would work a general
denial of effect to it. If A. has the absolute and unqualified
right to receive from and discharge into the adjoining land of B.
all the drainage and percolation, as they naturally flow between
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that land and his own, this is substantially a right to a use of
B.'s land, practically depriving the latter of all beneficial enjoyment of his property, and in effect amounting to an appropriation
of it; and as B. and the other neighboring landowners must have
similar rights, the improvement or beneficial occupation of land
becomes, in fact, impossible, and property in the soil for nearly
all useful purposes is annihilated. But we do not think it follows
from this, as some recent cases have held, that a landowner has
the full and unlimited ownership, and the absolute and unqualified
right of control of all water in or upon his land not gathered into
natural watercourses; for the non-existence of an absolute right
does not conclusively disprove the existence of a qualified right.
Nor do we think that the maxim cited can be applied to establish
an unqualified ownership of such waters in all cases, any more
properly than it can be relied on to prove an absolute property, in
all the air within one's bounds. If the landowner has the absolute and unqualified ownership of all such water in or upon his
land, his neighbor, by digging or otherwise, has no more right to
take away his property water, than his property land.
If, as respects the soil, he may dig as he pleases,'he is still in
general limited by the rule that, in digging, he must not take
away his neighbor's soil by effectually removing its natural supports. If a natural pond of uniform depth is equally divided
between two landowners, or if they have dug a -well, half on the
land of each, it perhaps would not be claimed that one may pump
his half of the pond or well dry without regard to the half of his
neighbor. But however this may be, if the water, not gathered
into natural watercourses, belongs absolutely to the owner of the
land, because it is a part of the soil, and for that reason only, it
must be subject to the same law as the other components of the
scil; the sand, loam, and rock, which may not ordinarily be removed by an adjacent owner by the withdrawal of their natural
supports; for the maxim from which such ownership is deduced,
when applied without qualification, as it must be to lead to this
conclusion, allows no sound distinction.
But such a doctrine would lead to exactly the same mischiefs
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that have caused the rejection of that first discussed; it would
prevent all improvement or beneficial enjoyment of land in pre
cisely the same way.
To be sure, the language and the doctrines of some of the cases
would seem to allow the landowner not only all the water in his
land, but all he can draw thither; but such a rule, it seems to us,
is in direct conflict with the principle upon which the theory is
founded, and must lead, in many cases, to an interminable struggle for possession or removal of waters in the soil. Indeed, we
do not know of any decision that perfectly carries out this doctrine of absolute ownership to its logical result; but so far as we
are aware, the cases maintaining it go no further than the, somewhat illogical view last suggested; probably because of the entire
incompatibility of the former with any beneficial use of land. But
this departure from the principle upon which they found their
theory, does not seem to us to have saved them from difficulty or
inconsistency. Nor do we think a sufficient foundation for this
doctrine of absolute ownership can be found in the alleged difficulty of determining the direction and extent of percolation and
drainage. In a large number of cases no such difficulty exists,
and the remainder may be provided for consistently, and in accordance with settled legal principles. We need not examine the
argument as to the non-existence of a presumed grant, drawn
from this alleged difficulty, for we do not understand the theory
of our law of watercourses to rest upon any such foundation; nor
need we inquire whether some of the cases which use the term
"common consent," in treating of the supposed origin of aquatic
rights, may not have confounded that with the doctrine of presumed grants, which could come from particular persons only in
any given case.
If this doctrine of absolute ownership is not well founded in
legal principles, certainly there is nothing in its practical opera.
tion that so commends it to our approwl as to lead to its adoption.
It must, if held-as in several cases, leave everywhere a conflict of
right and enjoyment, irreconcilable in law or in fact; and however
held, it will, in a variety of cases, lead to incalculable mischiefs.
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Logically followed out, this doctrine, if confined to the water
naturally in or upon the land, would forbid almost all interference
by each landowner with his own land; or if applied to all the
waters found in or upon the land not gathered into natural watercourses, would take away all remedy for malicious acts in relation
to them. But the injustice of the latter result has led to an
exception in several jurisdictions that seems anomalous under the
theory they adopt. As already suggested, we are not aware that
any of the cases have followed this doctrine of absolute ownership
rigidly to its logical conclusion, so as to forbid all interference
with another's property water, situate in his land; but even when
not pursued so far, it gives rise to other inconsistencies. If A.
owns a tract of land upon the westerly bank of a river, he may
maintain an action against B., who, by obstructing the river,
throws its waters into his soil throughout its whole extent unreasonably, and to his injury, and recover for the entire damage,
else we must hold that A. can only recover for the injury to the
film of soil in immediate contact with the watercourse, and for the
raising of the water in the channel over his land; and we can see
no legal distinction in this respect between throwing water into or
upon another's soil. -But if A. sells to C. the easterly half of his
land, he loses all -remedy for the continuance of the same injury
to the residue of his land; or if he sells to 0. the westerly half.
C. can have no remedy for the same injury, since the water only
percolates through the land of A. Or if a distinction is asserted
between the water of the- river and the water in the soil in such
case, suppose B., instead of throwing the water of the river itself
into C.'s land by unreasonably obstructing the stream, forces the
river water into the land of A., and thereby drives from the
latter's land into the land of C. an amount of water precisely
equal to that first supposed, producing exactly the same injury to
it; is 0. to be without remedy where the injury is the same, produced in the same general way, and by the same cause, because
of a difference, not in the nature or effects of the water, but
merely in its immediate and not necessarily its ultimate source?
Such distinctions and such results do not commend themselves to
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our judgment. Upon this theory you can have no more right to
remove from your neighbor's land a film of water than a film of
clay, for both are equally and absolutely his property. It cannot
be held that you have the right to dig as you please upon your
own land near a neighbor's well, provided "the last rib of earth"
that holds the water is not removed, even though the effect of the
operation may be to drain the well by percolations, for upon this
theory why the proviso? Practically the same result is reached
in either case; and if the proposition were correct, it would follow
that here the law allows :indirectly what it forbids directly. If
the prohibition has any reason, it is the preservation of the neighbor's well; or, in other words, of his water in it, for that is its
only valuable purpose. And this reason is equally applicable in
either case. We think that no foundation for such a distinction
can be found in the law. If the last rib of earth is yours, you
may, upon this doctrine, remove it because it is yours, and because
of your right to do as you please with your own; and any denial
of your right in such case, because of your neighbor's well, strikes
at the foundation of the hole theory. If it is your neighbor's,
you have no right to remove it, solely because it is his, and not
because it confines the water in his well.
It is to be observed, however, that the allowance of the removal
of the last rib of earth in such case, when it belonga to yourself,
disregards the absolute rights given to the neighbor by the same
theory, quite as much as the denial of that right would disregard
your own.
It seems to us inconsistent to hold that ordinarily you may not
drain a watercourse by digging away the bank, which is your land,
and yet to sustain a doctrine which would allow you to dig so
near it as to draw off all its water by percolation.
In either case you deal directly with your own merely; but in
the former you are forbidden, only because by so doing you take
what is not absolutely your own, because you drain a watercourse.
This is the sole and the sufficient reason. In the oth.-r ease exactly the same reason exists for not doing a similar act, producing
precisely the same effects that constitute the only objection in the
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former, and therefore the law of the cases should be the same;
and it would seem to follow that ordinarily you may not drain a
watercourse dry by means of percolation into your pits. Although
the law does not generally allow one directly to deprive the landowners below of the natural advantages of a common watercourse, yet this doctrine, as held in some of the cases, would
sometimes permit this mischief indirectly, by allowing all the
sources of supply to be cut off from the stream.
But it is unnecessary to multiply examples, or follow the doctrine in its varied applications; for we think enough instances
have been selected to show the nature of the difficulties attendant
on it. The law regulating watercourses has its origin or foundation in the benefits and injuries that may arise from water; and
among the f6rmer the -propulsion of machinery is but one of many.
These benefits and injuries may often be quite similar in cases of
under-ground and surfae drainage, and of drainage by watercourses., In such inquiries the ultimate source of the" water is
never regarded; and the immediate source seems to us equally
immaterial, since it in no way changes the .nature or effect of the
water; and the regulations now settled by the law of watercourses
were established not because of any peculiarity in the origin of
water in streams, but because of the good or harm that may
result from its management or use. Therefore, so far .as a similarity of benefits and injuries exists, there should be a similarity
in the rules of law applied. Whether the disposition or detention
of water in, or its removal from, land is caused by a watercourse.
or by other means, can create ordinarily no difference in the
effects of such disposition, detention, or removal.
We think it does not follow, as some of the cases seem to assume, that because a landowner has not the absolute and unrestrictod right of drainage to or from his neighbor's land, be has
no rights of drainage whatever, and thai each landowner has the
entire and unqualified ownership of all water found in his soil,
not gathered into natural watercourses, in the common acceptation
of that term.
There is another view entitled to consideration. If the rights
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are not absolute and unqualified, they are qualified, or there are
no rights at all. We need not argue that some rights exist; that
the owner of the land may make some use of ihe water in it; that
he may do some acts that will affect, to some extent, the drainage;
that a well may be dug, under some circumstances, although it
wilI draw water by percolation from a watercourse from adjoining
land, or even from the well of a neighbor. If the views we have
expressed are correct, they have already indicated the sole ground
of the qualification of the landowner's right in such cases, and
that is, as in certain cases of watercourses, the similar rights of
others; and this will, of course, determine the extent of the qualification, which, as in the analogous cases suggested, and for the
same reasons, is the rule of reasonable use-of a reasonable exercise of one's own right. The rights of each landowner being
similar, and his enjoyment dependent upon the action of the other
landowners, these rights must be valueless unless exercised with
ic
reference to each other, and are correlative. The maxim, !.'
Wsere," &c., therefore applies, and, as in many other cases, restricts
each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use of
his own property, in view of the similar rights of others. Instances
of its similar application in cases of watercourses, where the detention, pollution, or unnatural discharge of the water is complained- of, of highways, of alleged nuisances in regard to air, or
by noises, &c., &c., and of the manner of the application, are too
numerous and familiar to need more special mention. As in these
cases of the watercourse, so in the drainage, a man may exercise
his own right on his own land as he pleases, provided he does not
interfere with the rights of others. The rights are correlative,
and from the necessity of the case, the right of each is only to a
reasonable user or management; and whatever exercise of one's
right or use of one's privilege in such case is, under all the circumstances, and in view of the rights of others, such a reasonable
user or management, is not an infringement of the rights of others;
but any interference by one landowner with the natural drainage,
injurious to the land of another, and not reasonable, is unjustifiable. Every interference by one landowner with the natural

BASSETT

Y.

SALISBURY MANUFACTURLIG CO.

drainage, actually injurious to the land of another, would be unreasonable, if not made by the former in the reasonable use of
his own property. Although the plaintiffs' land was not situated
upon the river, yet, if the defendants, by means of their dam.
obstructed its natural drainage to the actual injury of the plaintiff,
they are liable, unless the obstruction was caused by the reasonable use of their own land or privilege; and the reasonableness of
the use would depend upon the circumstances of the case. What
in any particular case is a reasonable use or management, is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact, to be submitted to the
jury under the instruction of the court.
There is no necessary conflict between these views and the cases
which hold that a riparian proprietor below has in general no
right to raise the water of the stream above its natural level upon
the land of a riparian proprietor above. From a right to the
reasonable use of one's own property or privilege, there does not
usually result any right to the reasonable use- of another's property or privilege. It may be that in case of such flowage, the
law holds the use unreasonable, or that no question of reasonableness arises, because there may exist no* necessity in the case
that one should be allowed thus to flow back upon the land of his
supra-riparanneighbor similar to the necessity which requires
the application of the doctrine of reasonable use in cases of the
unnatural detention, discharge, or pollution of the waters of a
stream, and of drainage, in order that 'each proprietor should
have any practicably valuable enjoyment of his unquestioned
right or property. But these matters are not necessarily before
us here, and we do not intend to pass upon them at the present
time.
In this view we encounter none of the objections that we have
suggested as inseparable from the other doctrines, and it obviates
some difficulties and anomalies that would otherwise exist. The
raw as to malicious acts ceases to form an exception to the general rule; and the cases of difficulty in the previous determination
of the direction or extent of drainage are disposed of by the submission of this difficulty of determination to the jury, as one of
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the matters of fact bearing on the question of reasonableness.
Again, it is admitted that it is not essential to a watercourse
that the banks should be absolutely unchangeable, the flow constant, the size uniform, or the waters entirely unmixed with earth,
ar flowing with any fixed velocity; but the land does not and cannot fix the limits of variation in these particulars. Where a
watercourse originates, and is supplied from a natural lake, the
current in the latter may be hardly perceptible, yet it may be
doubted if any one, could justify the entire withholding of its
waters from the stream it should feed. Indeed, it is by no means
zertain that the entire absence of current in a lake would prevent
the application of the general principles that protect the rights
of landowners on running streams; for perhaps it will be found
that owners of land upon such lakes have similar qualified rights
to the enjoyment of these waters in their natural condition, and
to the reasonable use of them, and may claim that the water shall
not be unreasonably raised, lowered, or polluted, to their injury.
If the general principles governing the use of watercourses were
to be applied so far as may be to all water naturally percolating
or draining, then the occasion for a definition in the respects first
mentioned would cease in many cases; and if they were to be
extended to all water that may be put in motion by operations
upon land, there then would be no call for any distinction in the
principles, but only for an accurate discrimination of the facts
essential to their correct application, with reference to the rights
of others, and the legal necessities of the cases under their varying circumstances. But these questions are not now before us,
and we do not propose to examine them here.
The views we have adopted seem to us but an extension of rules
well settled and long applied in cases of similar water rights, to a
class of cases but recently brought into much discussion before
courts governed by the common law; and rules which, we think,
accord with many analogies of the law, and will in general work
no injustice or particular hardship to those interested.
We are aware that since the case of Acton vs. Blundell, the
the weight of authority elsewhere is against the view of the law
which we have adopted.
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A number of cases have been cited by the defendant's counsel,
and more may now be found, in which the reasoning conflicts with
the conclusion at which we have arrived; but with the highest
respect for the tribunals that have pronounced those decisions, we
are compelled to differ from the views they have expressed. These
cases are all of recent date, and a considerable number of conflicting decisions, and several dissenting opinions, show that their
doctrines have not met with uniform acceptance. It is unnecessary for us to inquire into the merits of the results reached in
these cases; for though we might be satisfied with such results in
particular instances, we are unable to assent to the reasoning by
which they have been reached. We are not aware that the doctrine of Acton vs. Blundell, and of the cases which follow it, has
been adopted in any decision in this state; but so far as the subject has been considered at all here, we think our decisions have
not tended in the direction of that case. See Portsmouth Aqeduot
Co. vs. Concord and Portsmouth Railroad (Rockingham, June
Term, 1860) ; Bassett vs. The Salisbury Aanf. Co., 28 N. H. 401 ;
Rome vs. Addison, 84 Id. 806; Johnson vs. Railroad, 85 Id. 569.
The verdict must be set aside, and a new trial granted.
For the foregoing opinion we are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Justice
BARTLETT. The English and American
cases are here presented by the counsel
considerably in detail, and they have
evidently been very carefully considered
by the court. But the importance and
difficulty of the questions involved will
justify a brief reference to .the history

the Digest, lib. 39, tit. 3, s. 12, we find it
laid down, "Denique Marcellus scribit,
cum eo, qui in suo fodiens, vicini fontem
avertit, nihil posse agi; nec de dolo
actionem, et sane non debet habere; si
non animo vicini nocendi, sea suum
agrum meliorem faciendi, id fecit." And
this seems to us to contain the germ of
the present English and American law
upon the subject, so far as that may be
of the law upon this subject.
I. The question of subterranean cur- regarded as settled.
II. This subject does not seem to have
rents of water, and of their being interrupted by means of digging at points attracted much attention in the English
remote from the place where they reach courts before the case of Acton vs. Blunthe surface, either naturally or by arti- dell, 12 M. & W. 324, where it was deficial means; and that this interruption cided, that the owner of land through
might occur upon the land of others so which water flows in a subterranean
as to present conflicting claims of right, course has no right or interest in it
seems to have attracted the attention of which will enable him to maintain an
the writers of the Roman Civil Law. In action against a landowner, who in
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csrrying on mining operations on his
own land in the usual manner, drains
awaythe water from the land of the firstmentioned owner, and lays his well dry.
And the same principle is declared in
Greenleaf vs. Francis, 18 Pick. R. 117.
But both of these cases go upon the
ground that the excavation is made in
the ordinary course of the use of his
own land by the adjoining proprietor,
and without the intention to damage his
neighbor, which some of the cases, in
pushing the principle too far, have assumed to deny Chatfield vs. Wilson,
2&Vt. R. 49. The rule of the Civi Law,
and the great majority of the cases, if
not all, with the exception of Chatfield
vs. Wilson, place stress upon the point
that the diversion must be made in good
faith, and not for the leading purpose of
doing an injury to the adjoining proprietor: Roath vs. Driscoll, 20 Conn. R.
533; Wheatley vs. Baugh, 25 Penn. St.
R. 528, 533; Pautan vs. Holland, 17
Johns. R. 92, 9&. And the same rule is
distinctly recognised by Lord WENsLEY-

in Chasemore vs. Richards, 5 Jur.
N. S. 873, as being established both in
the Civil Law and in the law of Scotland,
and as being the only sound view of the
question: viz., that the act be not done,
"animo vicini nocendi."
2. The question was again considered
in Dickinson vs. Grand Junction Canal
Co., 7 Exch. R. 282; Rawstrom vs. Taylor. 11 Exch. R. 369-; Broadbent vs.
Ramsbottom, Id. 602, s. c.34 Eng. L.
& Eq. R. 553; but the doctrines of the
case of Acton vs. Blundell were not essentially modified. Lord WENSLEYDALE
in the House of Lords, in Chasemore vs.
Richards, 5 Jur. N. S. 873, 877, 878;
s. o. 5 H. & N. 990, Am. Ed., and 7 H.
Lds. Cas. 374.
3. The question in regard to the right
to the continued percolation of water
through the soil in order to the supply
DALM,

of a spring or stream of water has been
very extensively considered by the English and American courts within the
last few years, and it is not improbable
that future discussion may show that
the rules of law are not yet entirely well
defined in regard to the rights and duties
of adjoining proprietors upon the subject.
I. It seems to be well settled by
a uniform course of decision, in the
English and American courts, that the
riparian proprietors of land over which
streams of water flow in well-defined
currents or channels, have a clear right
to have the water of such streams
continue its natural and accustomed
course, as matter of legal right, resulting
from the mere property of the soil, and
not -in any sense dependent upon prescriptionorlong-accustomed use. Mason
vs. Hill, 5 B. & Ad. 1, 17. And tlesame
principle is reaffirmed by the House of
Lords, in Chasemore vs. Richards, supra.
Acton vs. Blundell, supra; Smith vs.
Kenrick, 7 C. B. 615.
2. There seems to be no question that
the same principles will apply to subteranean currents of water which are
well-defined and fully known: Dickinson
vs. Grand Junction Canal Co., 7 Exch.
R. 300, 301; Chasemore vs. Richards.
,upra;
Arnold vs. Foot, 12 Wend. 330.
3. But it seems that these principles
do not apply to such subterranean currents as are unknown, or to water percolating through the soil, but that in
regard to these every proprietor may
use his own soil, as is most convenient
to his own purposes, without thereby
becoming responsible in damages for
diverting water of percolation or of
unknown subterranean currents, from
his neighbor's well, or spring, or stream.
This point is discussed at length in
the recent case of Chasemore vs. Richards, in the Court of Exchequer Chain-
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ber, 2 Hurl. & Nor. 168, and "in the
House of Lords, 7 Ho. Lds. Cas. 374,
and the authorities carefully reviewed,
and all the incidental questions examined with great learning and ability.
The point decided, was that the owner
of a mill on the bank of a river cannot
maintain an action against a landowner
who sinks a deep well upon his own
land, and by pumps and steam-engine
diverts the underground water, which
would otherwise have percolated the
soil, and flowed into the river, by which
for more than sixty years the mill was
worked. Six of the common law judges
sat with the law lords in the House of
Lords, in hearing the appeal, and were
unanimous in favor of the decision.
There seems to have been no dissent
from the doctrine declared, except that
of COLERIDOS,

J., in

the Exchequer

Chamber, and the hesitation of Lord
WENSLEYDAE, "in'the House of Lords.

The case of Ralston vs. Bensted, 1 Camp.
463, and Dickinson vs. Grand Junction
Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282, s. o.15 Beavan
260, were here dissented from and overruled.
A similar question arose in the Court
of King's Bench in Hodgkinson vs.
Ennor, 9 Jur. N. S. 1152, when it was
decided in May last, that where the
plaintiff's mill was supplied in .part by
water-power from the water-shed of the
Mendip Hills, which was drained by
means of "Swallets," which are natural
fissures in the rock, of which the highland is composed, haviig each an underground passage for water, communicating with an outlet at the foot of the
hills. The defendant discharged water
which had been used in a minery worked
by him on the hills, in a foul and polluted state, which finding its way into
the swallets flowed thence into the
stream upon which an ancient mill of

the plaintiff was situate, thereby con
taminating the same and rendering is
unfit for his pui-poses; and it was held
that the above cases did not apply, and
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The case is placed upon the ground hat
the water flowing under ground a part
of the way in the swallets did not make
the case essentially different from what
it would be if the swallets were upon
the surface. And a distinction is also
taken'between the pollution and the abstraction of water percolating through
the soil, thus assuming the ground
maintained by ELLSWORTH, J., in dissenting from the opinion of the Couit
in Brown vs. Illius, 25 Conn. R. 683.
We think it may be safely assumed
that the proprietor of land through
which water passes in a state of percolation may use the same in any manner
convenient and advantageous to himself,
notwithstanding such use may operate
incidentally to the damage of a neighboring proprietor. Such result will be
what the law denominates damnum abisgu
injuria. But the proprietor of land
through which water passes either in
unknown subterranean currents, or by
way of percolation, is not at liberty, even
for his own convenience, to poison the
water so as injuriously to affect either
vegetable or animal life upon his neighbor's land.
The London Jurist of November 28,
1863; contains a summary review of the
English cases upon this question, and a
brief reference to the case of Brown vs.
Illius, 25 Conn. R. 583, dissenting from
the doctrine of the latter case.
The subject is carefully examined in
Washburn on Easements, pp. 863-390.
and most of the cases reviewed. We
should not-feel justified in pursuing it
L F. R.
further here.

McCREEDY vs. CALLAHAN.

In the District Court of the City of Philadelphia
McCREEDY VS.

CALLAHAN.

The- cost of the stamp required by the U. S. Internal Revenue Act, to be affixed
to a deed, is properly a part of the expense of making the deed, and is to be
paid by the party paying for the deed.
[It
being the custom in Philadelphia, in the absence of express contract, for the
purchaser to pay for the deed, he is also chargeable with the cost of the stamp.

Case stated. The defendant purchased at public sale a certain
property, at the price of $90,000, plaintiff having previously
contracted with him to "execute a good and sufficient deed in fee
simple." The deed of conveyance was prepared, and presented
to plaintiff to execute, but a question having arisen as to which
party should pay for the stamps required by law to be attached to
the deed, the cost in this instance being $180, a case was stated
for the opinion of the court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, P. J.-The question presented now is, whether the

vendor or vendee, under a contract "to execute a good and sufficient deed in fee simple," is bound to pay for the stamps. The
case states that "it has for many years been the custom in this
city that purchasers of real estate furnish the deed." The contract here is not that the vendor shall prepare, but. execute the
deed. If it had been the former it would have overridden the
custom. But as it does not, we see no reason to refuse full weight
to such a usage. It is a reasonable custom. It saves all dispute
as to the style, manner, and verbiage of the deed, whether it shall
be written or printed on parchment or paper, whether the searches
shall be more or less minute. Eventually we know that all taxes
and expenses attending the transfer of property fall on the seller.
The purchaser, if he calculates closely, includes the expenses of
obtaining the title, in his estimate of the price, which he will give
for the property.
Judgment for plaintiff, $180.
A recently published opinion of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as
VOL. XII-16

to the party chargeable with payment
for the stamps affixed to a deed, (Phila.
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Legal Intelligencer, vol. 20, p. 368), has
invited attention not only to the subject
specially treated of in the letter of Commissioner Lewis, but also to the precise
weight and authority to which such
opinions may be entitled in law.
1. By the Act of 1 July 1862, sect. 1,
the offic& of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue was created "for the purpose
of superintending the collection of internal duties, stamp duties, licenses, or
taxes imposed by this Act, or which may
be hereafter imposed, and of assessing
the same;" and by the same section his
duties are defined to be "preparing all
the instructions, regulations, directions,
forms, blanks, stamps, and licenses, and
distributing the. same or any part thereof, and all other matters pertaining to
the assessment and collection of the duties," &c.
By these and other provisions,, it
clearly appears that he is an executive
officer, and is charged only with executive duties, except in sect. 103, which
provides that if the Commissioner be of
opinion that an instrument presented to
him is not chargeable with stamp duty,
he shall affix to it a stamp denoting that
fact, and every such instrument shall
then "be deemed to be not so chargeable, and shall be received in evidence
in all courts of law or equity notwithstanding any objections made to the
same, as being chargeable with stamp
duty, and not stamped to denote the
same." This section, however, though
imposing a qualified judicial duty on
the commissioner, may be considered as
designed merely to estop the Government from claiming a stamp duty after
the opinion of its authorized officer that
none is due, and to declare that the
party so protected against the Government itself shall not suffer any of the
collateral punishments provided by the
Act for those who neglect the payment
of proper stamp duties. That this is the

sole object of the provision appears from
the fact that the opinion of the Commissioner, should he decide that the instrn
ment requires a stamp, is not made conclusive on the other party, who may
still have his resort to the proper judicial tribunal.
The Commissioner, therefore, is an
executive officer merely, and his decisions are to be received not as authoritative expositions of the law, but as
indicating the practice of the department which will, if acquiesced in, become authoritative by force of custom.
II. In regard to the special subject
under discussion in the case before us,
we think the Commissioner's letter open
to a good deal of criticism.
1. He says: "The 94th section of the
Act of Congress of July 1st, 1862, requires, that the stamp shall be paid for
by the person or party 'who shall make,
sign, or issue' the instrument, ' or for
whose* use the same shall be made.
signed, or issued.'
"The 95th section of the same Act,
provides, that if any person shall make,
sign, or issue, or cause to be made,
signed, or issued, any instrument, without being duly stamped, such person
shall incur a penalty of fifty dollars,
and the instrument shall be deemed invalid." From these he proceeds to argue
that it is necessary that the grantor shall
affix a stamp to his deed, and that tho
grantee is not bound to accept it unless
properly stamped. He further adds that
the grantor is bound by the law to sen
that his deed is properly stamped, and
is liable to the penalties of the Act unless it is done. "Hemustdo it himself
or cause it to be done; although the expense, as between the parties, may be
shifted by contract, their private arrangements cannot affect the obligations
of either to the Government, and where
there is no contract, the party who
makes the deed, is bound to make one
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that will be recognised, and admitted as
an instrument of evidence, which it cannot be till a stamp is purchased or procured, affixed and cancelled."
Admitting this to be correct,- (though
we think the statement of sect. 94 by no
means unobjectionable), it would be a
fair argument in favor of the duty of
the vendor to pay the expenses of the
conveyance, were that an open question,
but we submit that it is foreign to the
present purpose. Tho question is not
who shall affx and cancel the stamp,
but who shall pay for iL There is no
doubt of the duty of the grantor to sign
a deed, and in Pennsylvania to acknowledge it before a justice so that it may
be recorded, yet the custom of this state
makes the grantee pay the justice's fee
for the grantor's acknowledgment, as a
part of the general expenses of the conveyance. And the Commissioner, when
he says "the expense as between the
parties may be shifted by contract,"
concedes the very point he has been
arguing against, for if it may be the
duty of the vendee under a special contract to pay for the stamp, why may it
not also in the absence of special contract under a custom which constitutes
the general law of such cases?
It would seem, therefore, that the
expense of the stamp does not necessarily fall always upon the vendor or always on the vendee, but depends upon
the contract of purchase, or, failing any
special provision in that, upon the law
established by custom as to the payment
of the expenses of the conveyance.
2. The Commissioner next proceeds
to discuss the custom established by
conveyancers for the vendee to pay for
the stamp, as follows: "In some locali-

ties, it is said that conveyancers have
established a rule, that the cost of
stamps is to be borne by grantees, and
I am asked to say, whether contracts
for the purchase and sale of real estate
in such localities, may not be properly
considered as having been made in
reference to such a rule, and thus to
have incorporated it. No contract can
be properly construed in reference to a
rule of conveyancers, until such rule
has become a recognised custom, and it
is impossible that a custom should exist
in the face of a statute less than a year
old."
With deference to the Commissioner,
we again submit that this is no answer
to the question asked, or if the inquiry
was put in this form it was very inartificially done.
The question really presented was
not whether conveyancers have made a
custom in regard to payment for stamps.
which are of recent introduction, but
whether the cost of stamps comes within
the general custom of conveyancers,
already established, that the grantee
shall pay the expenses of the conveyance.
This is the point decided by the principal case, and though we do not think
there was much doubt upon it among
the profession previous to the publication of the Commissioner's letter, yet
we are glad to see it settled by the opinion of a court of the ability and authority of the District Court of Philadelphia.
Of course in other states where the custom is understood to be that the vendor
pays the expenses of the conveyance,
the principle of the decision would cast
upon him the duty of paying for the
J.T. i.
stamps.

DODGE ET AL. vs. BACHE.

In the Supreme Court of _Pennsylvania.
WILLIAM E. DODGE

et al. vs.

JOHN N. BACHE.

An agent's liability to his principal for negligence by which a third person hat
.been injured, is only 'contingent, while it is direct and certain to the party
injured.
An action against the principal by the party injured is res inter atios acta as to
the agent, and the record is not admissible in evidence against him, except a
to the amount of damages.
Therefore the rule that excludes an agent from testifying for his principal in such
an action, is not founded in clear reason, and should not be extended; and his
testimony should not be rejected, except upon the quantum of damages, unless

his liability over has been clearly proved.

Bache, plaintiff below, was the owner of a parcel of saw-logs
lying in Pine Creek, a navigable stream and public highway, about
four miles below Marsh Creek Pond. This pond was also on a
navigable stream and public highway, and was kept up by Dodge
'& Co., plaintiffs in error, for the purpose of running the saw-mill
thereto attached, and also for the purpose of a harbor for sawlogs. It was so constructed that about eight feet of heAd could
be let off at once, thereby making a flood in the creek below.
These logs were put into the creek for the purpose of being floated
to a mill about one mile below. McDougall was the agent of
Dodge & Co., and had the general supervision of their business
about this mill and pond, and had notice that these logs were in
the creek below, and liable to be washed away by a flood from this
pond. He took no precautions to guard against it, but let the
pond off without any notice to Bache, and washed the logs away.
Thereupon Bache brought his action on the case against Dodge
& Co. for the negligence of their agent McDougall.
On the trial defendants offered the deposition of McDougall,
the agent, showing that the act complained of was not done by
him. To this offer plaintiff objected on the ground of interest in
the witness, and the court sustained the objection. This is the
point assigned as error in this cause.
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Pierce and Wilson, for plaintiffs in error.-The deposition of
McDuugall was rejected upon the ground that he was interested
in the event of the cause. A recovery against the defendants
elow would not necessarily have entitled them to a recovery
against him. To exclude his testimony the plaintiff must make
out a case for the defendants against him: MXcredy vs. The
Schuylkill Navigation Co., 3 Whart. 441; Smith vs. Seward, 3
Barr 342.
Henry Sherwood, for defendant in error.-The deposition of
McDougall went directly to throw the responsibility off the
shoulders of the witness and put it on to others, and thus relieve
himself of all responsibility to his principals, the defendants
below. For this purpose he is not a competent witness: 1 Stark.
Ev. 149; 1 Greenl. Ev. 540, § 417; McDowell vs. Simpson, 3
Watts 135; Juniata Bank vs. Beale, 1 W. & S. 229; Plumer vs.
Alexander, 2 Jones 81; Dorancevs. Commonwealth, 1 Harris 160,
165; Schuylkill Co. vs. Harris,5 W. & S. 28; Orphans' Court vs.
Woodburn, 7 Id. 166; Gilpin vs. Howell, 5 Barr 51.
The witness was not released. He was not a competent witness
until he was. The declaration charges the negligence of the witness while acting as the agent of the plaintiffs in error. That
negligence was the gist of the action; the evidence sustained the
declaration.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The rule which excludes an agent from testifying
for his principal, in actions brought against the principal for
alleged negligence 'of tle agent, though recognised in many cases,
is not founded in clear reason. He is held generally incompetent,
because, in the event of a recovery against his principal, he would
be liable over, and the judgment recovered would be admissible in
evidence against him. His liability to his principal is, however,
but contingent, while it is direct and certain to the party injured
by his negligence. Satisfaction recovered from his principal
exonerates him from this certain liability, and leaves his responsibilki
over still only contingent. But it is said the judgmens
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against the principal is admissible in an action which he may
bring against the agent. Why it should be, it is hard to see.
The agent is not a party to it nor a privy. He had no right to
conduct the defence, to call witnesses, or to interfere in any
manner between his principal and the party injured. Why then
should he be affected by a record that is wholly res inter alios P
Yet such a judgment is undoubtedly held to be evidence against him,
not evidence to establish his liability, but admissible to show the
quantum of damages. His liability must be shown by other
proof. The questions whether he was negligent, and whether the
injury for which satisfaction was recovered from the principal,
was a consequence of his negligence, remain open, and are not
solved in any degree by the record. Notwithstanding, then, a
recovery against the principal, it may be that the agent is not
responsible over to him, and at most it would seem his testimony
for the principal should be rejected only when offered to reduce
the estimate of damages.
Based upon reasons so unsatisfactory, this rule of exclusion
should not be extended. The testimony of the agent should not
be rejected unless his liability over has been clearly proved. It
is not to be assumed by the court. The general presumption is
that every witness is competent, and it is incumbent upou the
party who objects to him to show a clear disqualification.
In such a case as this, he must show not only that the act complained of was negligence, but that it was unmistakeably done by
the witness whom he seeks to exclude. Until this has been shown,
no interest, certain or contingent, is made out.
Turning now to the case in hand, it appears to have been an
action to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the defendants. The act complained
of was opening their dam at Marsh Creek Mill, thereby causing a
flood in the stream which carried away the logs of the plaintiff.
The main questions were whether the dam was opened at the time
when the logs were lost, and, if it was, by whom it was opened.
Two counts in the plaintiff's declaration aver that it was done by
McDougall, an agent of the defendants. On the trial, after the
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evidence of the plaintiff had been submitted, the defendants ofiered
the deposition of McDougall, to show that the water in the dam
was not opened by him, but the court rejected the deposition on
the ground that the witness was interested. This was assuming
that he was liable over to the defendants in case of a recovery by
the plaintiff. But how did that appear? Clearly he was not, if
he did not open the dam, even though it may have been opened
by others. The fact that he was an agent is nothing, if he was
not an active agent in the act complained of. The averments in
the declaration amount to no proof of his agency. If they did,
it would often be in the power of a party, at his own pleasure, to
exclude the most important witnesses of his adversary by simply
averring an agency. And in examining the testimony submitted
by the plaintiff, we find no evidence that the dam was opened by
McDougall, or in pursuance of his orders. There is hardly any
evidence that it was opened at all, at the time when the plaintiff's
logs floated away. Certainly there is nothing to sustain an averment that the witness would be responsible to the defendants, if
the plaintiff should recover. In rejecting the deposition, an
interest in the witness was assumed without proof, assuredly without such clear proof as the law requires to justify setting aside a
witness as incompetent. There was error, therefore, in rejecting
the deposition.
And the error was the more palpable when the deposition was
offered in connection with evidence that McDougall had been
directed by his principals to open the pond and let off the water
.whenever there should be water enough to float logs to a lower mill.
Such a direction tended to show that he would not be liable to his
employers even if he did open the dam, and therefore raised a
presumption against the existence of any interest.
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

